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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 14637

DONNA I. KNUDSEN,
Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has furnished a general summary of the basic facts applicable to this case.
This brief will, however, detail additional facts which are pertinent and necessary to a
complete argument on behalf of respondent.
Respondent questions the necessity on the part of appellant in reciting portions of the
facts, particularly those relating to evidence adduced at the trial, inasmuch as the only issue
certified on appeal by appellant was the abstract principle of ". . .the propriety of the
Court granting severance damages in addition to an award for an air easement only in a
condemnation lawsuit." (R. 7)

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO AUTHORITY CAN BE FOUND TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONTENTION THAT SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO REMAINING
PROPERTIES CANNOT BE AWARDED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
SITUATIONS INVOLVING THE TAKING OF AERIAL EASEMENTS.
At the outset it should be pointed out to this Court that appellant certified a single legal
issue on appeal (R. 7) involving the abstract proposition that, as a matter of law, severance
damages cannot be awarded in a condemnation taking of an air easement only. Further,
appellant certified to the lower Court that ". . .he does not intend to rely on a transcript of
the record, proceedings and evidence in the appeal presented hereby to the Supreme Court.''
Faced with the foregoing representations, respondent now faces a situation where
appellant has relied heavily in its brief upon factual matters developed at the trial in
attempting to support a supposedly abstract legal principle and, in addition, raises an
additional point on appeal complaining that the trial court allowed the introduction of
speculative evidence to support the severance damages awarded. In anticipation of this very
thing happening — and knowing full well that no case law could possibly be found to
support the abstract legal principle certified on appeal, respondent sought to protect her
position by designating for inclusion in the record the transcript of the testimony of the
respective expert appraisal witnesses and respondents Exhibit 8 (an aerial map and overlay).
But the difficulty has not been completely protected against since those portions of the
record designated by respondent do not completely provide this Court with everything
which took place at the trial, such as the testimony of other witnesses and discussions and
arguments with the lower Court. With the foregoing explanation and caveat, respondent
will nevertheless meet the contentions of appellant's brief with such portions of the record
as have actually been certified.
Appellants appears to place substantial weight on the language found in the case of
Provo River Water Users Association v. Carlson, 103 U. 93, 133 P. 2d 777 in support of its
position that severance damages can never be awarded in aerial easement situations. On
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page 5 of its brief is found the commentary from that case observing the policy of
awarding—
" severance damages and damages to lands not taken, on some physical
injury to lands not condemned. . . so as to render it less valuable for purposes
to which it was formerly adapted. . .or some other condition which would
operate to depreciate the market value of the property remaining."
The quoted language taken from the Carlson case is somewhat vague, but if examined
in connection with our Code provision and if the entire quotation is examined, its meaning
and intent is clear and its interpretation furnishes no assistance whatsoever to appellant's
position.
Section 78-34-10 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that in situations where a
portion of a larger property is condemned, recovery may be had for the —
". . .damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned
by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."
In other words, where property rights are taken, damages to remaining properties not
taken can be predicated upon the severance from the larger tract of the property taken
whether it be fee title or some other interest (such as an easement) which takes away a
portion of the "bundle of rights" from the property. In addition, damages to properties not
taken can also be recovered in those situations involving a taking of a property right where
they result from the ". . .construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff" Our courts and the courts of every jurisdiction have recognized that the two
contributing features of severance damages and damages to lands not taken include the
future use which will be made of the rights acquired in the condemnation proceeding.
It should be pointed out that many legal writers and trial attorneys classify all damages
resulting ^0m taking situations under sub-section (2) of Section 7C M-10 under the general
terminology of "severance" damages. Where there is no taking involved, but where
damages result to a property by the construction of a public improvement, as provided in
sub-section (3), of Section 78-34-10, the nomenclature generally applied is that of
"consequential" damages.
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If we revert to the same quotation from the Carlson case, and include the portion
deleted by appellant, it reads as follows:
"All of the cases in the Court which we have been able to find, have
predicated both severance damages and damages to lands not taken, on some
physical injury to lands not condemned, such as lowering or raising the level
of a street or highway so as to impair access, obstruction of light and
view, restriction of the remaining area in size or shape so as to render it less
valuable for purposes to which it was formerly adapted, or the creation of
noise, smoke, or some other condition which would operate to depreciate
the market value of the property remaining."
In the instant case severance damages to the remaining property of respondent fits
neatly within the illustrations of the quoted statement from the Carlson case, particularly
since remaining lands not subject to the easements were left in such a size and shape as to be
less valuable for purposes to which they were formerly adapted and because of aircraft
noise. This will be brought out in argument in the following point. Decisions since the
Carlson case have clearly established the rule that properties not taken need not necessarily
sustain physical injury in order for an award of severance damages to be made, and a
reading of the quotation taken from the Carlson case makes it manifestly clear that the
word "physical" was used in a very broad sense in view of the illustrations enumerated.
Both the Carlson case the the Church Farm case {State v. Cooperative Security Corp., 1
d. 2d 178, 264 P. 2d 281) were cases involving the taking of farm pasture lands from dairy
operations in the Heber Valley area. In each case the claim was made that the actual taking
of lands resulted in an imbalance of the total dairy farm such as would result in a
diminution in value of other lands not taken. In short, damages to the remaining properties
were based solely upon the loss of the lands taken. The crux of the decisions in both
cases was that there were other pasture lands in the immediate vicinity which were so similar
in use and location, and which could have been purchased, as would restore the operating
efficiency of the farm units. Since such restoration or cure was possible, the basis for
awarding severance damages due to the loss of the use of the property taken became
untenable. The denial of severance damages therefore was proper.
Oddly enough, the Carlson and Church Farm cases have been referred to in the
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condemnation field as being leading cases in the area of procedural law, rather than
substantive law. For many years some district court judges have insisted that property
owners who seek severance damages resulting from the loss of use of properties taken
should assume the burden of proving that there were not other adequate and suitable
substitute replacement lands in the area, thus placing an additional burden upon property
owners in the preparation of their cases. However, this particular matter was challenged in
1968 in the case of State Road Commission v. Bingham, 20 U. 2d 246, 436 P. 2d 803 and,
notwithstanding appellant's commentary on page 6 of its brief that the Carlson case "has
been quoted approvingly by the Utah Supreme court at least three subsequent times and has
never been overruled. . .", this Court in the Bingham case did in fact overrule that case
insofar as it was being interpreted up to that time:
"The State's position, in the instant case, would, in effect, require the landowner to prove a negative — that he could not with reasonable diligence
acquire a new access — before he could prove severance damage for loss of
access. In support of this position, the State cites State v. Cooperative
Security Corp. and Provo River Water Users Assn. v. Carlson. . . Although
neither of the cited cases specifically held that the burden is upon the landowner to prove that he was unable to mitigate or minimize severance damages, if the language in these cases implies such a rule, the same is hereby
rejected.
"We hold that in a condemnation action it is the condemnee's burden to
prove severance damage, but that before doing so he does not generally have
the burden of first showing that such damage, if any, could not be minimized
or mitigated."
The Carlson case serves appellant no succor because the damages in the instant
situation have not been founded upon the actual loss of all use of the adjoining lands or of
the lands from which the easements have been taken; and, even if such claim had been
made, the Bingham case would place the burden of proving availability of substitute lands
upon appellant — a burden it did not undertake to establish.
Since the Carlson decision this Court has also seen fit to approve an award of severance
damages to properties not taken where the taking and the construction of the project (an
adjoining viaduct overpass) affected property rights inherent in the properties not taken. In
the case of State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P. 2d 926 (1974), this Court held that
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easement rights of access, light, air, view and privacy are property rights which may not be
impaired without just compensation.
Before proceeding too far into this discussion, we should look at the aerial easements
actually being taken. Appellant's brief (P.6) suggests that the only easement being acquired
is that necessary ". . .to limit the heighth to which buildings or other obstructions would be
allowed to exist." Further, in support of its position, reference is made to United States v.
48.01 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258, Olsen v. U.S., 292 U.S. 246, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 L.
Ed. 1236, and Boyd v. U.S., 222 F. 2d 493. The federal cases included holdings that, under
their facts, compensation could not be awarded resulting from the flights of aircraft. The
difficulty with plaintiffs contention, and its quoted cases in support thereof, is that it has
not read the easement which it has acquired in this case (R. 20):
AVIATION EASEMENT
" . . . a perpetual and assignable easement over and above the following
described land in which the Grantor holds a fee- simple estate:
(13.1961 acres described)
"The grantor agrees that they, their heirs, successors and assigns, shall not
hereafter erect, or permit the erection of any structure or any growth, tree
or other object within the boundaries of the hereinabove described land in
excess of 24 feet above ground level.
"The Grantor further agrees that the easement and right hereby granted to
the Grantee in and over the hereinabove described land are for the purposes
of insuring that the said land remain free and clear of any structure, tree
or other objects for the protection of the flight of aircraft in landing and
taking off at the Provo Municipal Airport; that the rights shall include but
not be limited to the following:
1. The continuing and perpetual right to cut to 24 feet above ground
level and remove trees, brushes, shrubs or any other perennial growth or
undergrowth.
2. The right to remove, raise or destroy existing buildings, or structures
and the right to prohibit the future erection of buildings or other structures
above the height limit of 24 feet.
3. The right of ingress and egress from and passage over the land of the
Grantor, hereinabove described, for the above purposes.
"4. For the use and benefit of the public, the right of flight for the
passage of aircraft in air-space above the hereinabove described land, to6

gether with the right to cause in such air-space such noise as may be inherent
in the operation of aircraft, now known or hereinafter used for navigation
of or flight in air, using such airspace or landing at or taking off from or
operating on the Provo Municipal Airport.
5. To have and to hold said easement and all rights appertaining
thereto unto the Grantee, its successors or assign, until said Provo Municipal
Airport shall be abandoned and shall cease to be used for public airport
purposes.
It is understood and agreed that these convenants and agreements shall run
with the land and shall be binding upon the heirs, administrators, executors,
successors and assigns of the Grantor and for the purpose of this instrument,
the land hereinabove described, shall be an approach area and shall be the
servient tenement and said Provo Municipal Airport shall be the dominent
tenement."
(R. 20, 21)
A brief examination of the foregoing Aviation Easement makes it abundantly clear that
an easement of limitation of buildings or other obstructions as to height exists, but it is also
clear (paragraph 4) that the appellant is also acquiring a flight easement to utilize in the
future the airspace above the 13.1961 acres and to subject the property to all manner of
noise as may occur from any type of air flight activity whenever it may occur at any time in
the future. The easement is extremely broad, it contains both types of easement rights and it
is certainly very physical in the type of use which can be made of the property; i.e.; ingress
and egress, aerial overflights, height restrictions on buildings, trees and other objects, and
the impression of noise upon the land.
To attempt to argue that the instant situation fits that of the federal cases cited by
appellant is unfounded in the light of the express language of the easements being acquired.
One citation found at page 7 of appellant's brief taken from the Boyd case is, however,
appropriate to show that severance damages are the subject of a factual inquiry in aerial
easement cases, as a matter of law:
4

'Whenever there has been an actual physical taking of a part of a distinct
tract of land, the compensation to be awarded includes not only the market
value of that part of the tract appropriated, but the damage to the remainder
resulting from that taking, embracing. . . injury due to the use to which the
part appropriated is to be devoted."
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RESPONDENT'S EXPERT WITNESS DID NOT FURNISH SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
As previously pointed out, appellant certified to the Court that its only issue on appeal
was that of the legal propriety of granting severance damages in an aerial easement case. In
its brief it now comes forth with a new contention, claiming that speculative evidence was
offered by respondent's appraiser, Wilbur Harding. However, even as to the additional
point raised on appeal, an examination of the transcript fails to reveal any place where
counsel for appellant objected to the introduction of evidence on the ground that it was
speculative in nature. The gist of the objection to testimony concerning severance damages
was raised by appellant's counsel (R. 98) in an effort to exclude any evidence pertaining to
severance damages as a matter of law:
"MR. ELLIS:

The measure of damages, according to the law, is the before and
after value, and severance damages has no part in that.

MR. FULLER:

That's the most incorrect statement of law. . . that I ever heard of.

MR. ELLIS:

Well, I will stand on it. . ."

At this point appellant is simply arguing to this Court the matter of the weight of the
evidence, claiming that (as his appraiser analyzed the matter) the lands of respondent were
simply agricultural in every respect. Appellant's appraiser Paul Brown, however, placed a
value on the property prior to the taking of $4,000.00 per acre (R. 68), a figure which Mr.
Brown admitted was not consistent with agricultural uses and admittedly premised upon the
assumption that buyers at that price would be ". . .looking for other reasonable uses in the
future." (R. 73, 74)
Appellant attempted to restrict the highest and best use of the Knudsen property to that
solely involving agricultural uses, relying on the applicable zoning at the time of the
condemnation. But Mr. Wilbur Harding, respondent's appraiser, pointed out that in his
opinion the highest and best use of the property at the time of the taking was that of a
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suburban residential use (R. 88) in the reasonably foreseeable future and that a probability
of rezoning to accommodate that use would have been very likely had not the airport
project been known and provided for in advance of the time of the taking (R. 104). Mrs.
Knudsen's testimony, had it been transcribed and included in the record, would have
pointed out how Provo City and the airport authorities had for quite some time
manipulated the zoning of her lands so as to restrict sales and building activities in the
immediate area prior to the actual condemnation.
In any event, the land values of $4,000.00 per acre furnished by Mr. Brown for
appellant and $5,000.00 per acre as testified to by Mr. Harding for respondent are not so
much apart as to create a substantial argument on the issue of highest and best use of the
properties, And, for that matter, the amount of diminution in value of the land actually
taken for the easement itself did not reflect any substantial differences between the two
appraisers.
This leaves us with the contention of appellant that severance damages to lands not
impressed with the aviation easements could not be awarded in any event. In this respect
Mr. Harding pointed out that the lands carried a highest and best use of suburban
residential, being serviced with highways and utilities and located in an area of growth on
Center Street in Provo (R. 89). He testified that, except for the airport project, there would
have been a reasonable probability of re-zoning in the foreseeable future to that use and, in
fact, it was brought out (R. 80) that the zoning had actually been changed from 20 acres per
building site to 10 acres in the last year. He further explained that the farming activity on
the property was simply an interim, or temporary, use (R. 90).
The matter of probably rezoning of property was discussed in the case of State Road
Commission v. Jacobs, 16 U. 2d 167, 397 P. 2d 463 (1964) where this Court held:
". . .The owner of property under condemnation is entitled to a value based
upon the highest and best use to which it could be put at the time of the
taking, without limitation as to the use then actually made of it. However,
the projected use, affecting value, must be not only possible, but reasonably
probable. It must not be merely in the realm of speculation because the land
is adaptable to the particular use in the remote and uncertain future. In
any event, the admission of such evidence is within the sound discretion
of the trial court, . . . "
9

"Where the enactment ofi the zoning restriction is not predicated upon the
inherent evil of the proscribed use. . . and there is a possibility or probability
that the zoning restriction may Ije |n the near future be repealed or amended
so as to permit the use in questibn, such likelihood mayt>e considered if the
prospect of such repeal or amendment is sufficiently likely as to have an
appreciable influence upon present market value."

In arriving at tne amount or tne value or tne easement taken, Mr. Harding reasoned
that combination of noise (R. 95, 96), restrictions on height of trees, roofs, and the
easement cloud on the title (R. 94, 95) would have the result of reducing the 13.1691 acres to
a "lower density use, much more so with the easement on it than you would without." He
explained that homes would still be placed on the property, but that the land would not
bring as much money (R. 97), that the homes would be lower priced and of lower quality,
and that financing would be harder to get (R. 98). From these factors, he assessed the value
of the easement taken and, although Mr. Brown did not elaborate as to his reasons for
assigning a value to the easement taken, the two appraisers did not differ substantially.
Coming next to the matter of any possible severance damages to remaining properties,
Mr. Harding pointed out that to the north and to the west of the easement area — and part
of the Knudsen property — were two remaining narrow, long and irregular shaped tracts of
land upon which no easement had been taken. Although Mr. Harding did not assess damage
to the lands to the east of the easement area which had frontage against Center Street (R.
99), he testified that those two fringe areas, being 9 acres in total, would sustain the same
general type of altered use as the land within the easement area (i.e. lower quality homes
and lower priced homes and land) because the 9 acres of fringe areas were "so involved" as
an integral part of the development of the tract from which the easements were taken (R.
100). He explained that their size, shape and location required that they necessarily be
developed with the easement-imposed lands and that the 9 acres of fringe lands sustained a
diminution in value of $1,000.00 per acre, being half of that sustained by the areas
subjected to the easements, mainly because the restriction as to height would not involve the
9 acres nor would there be a cloud on the title showing the easement (R. 103, 104, 105).
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Center Street

Severance award to 9 a c r e s
in t h e s e a r e a s

Total Ownership
33. 37 a c r e s

It is sometimes helpful to produce an illustration or diagram to explain why a severance
damage can occur in a case such as this. Exhibit 8 has been reproduced showing the long,
triangular and irregular shaped fringe areas located to the north and west of the easement
area taken. It takes little imagination to see why any reduction in the nature of the use of
the 13.1961 acres would also substantially apply to those 9 acres.
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CONCLUSION

Respondent submits that the judgment entered by the lower Court be affirmed because.
1. Appellant has failed to produce any law, and none can be found, which holds that
severance damages cannot be awarded as a matter of law in any situation to properties of an
owner which lie contiguous to lands upon which an aerial easement has been taken.
2. Appellant did not certify an issue on appeal pertaining to the admissibility of
evidence; and, in any event, appellant took no proper exception to the admission of
evidence claimed to be speculative in nature, has not furnished law which would justify any
such objection being takeneither at the trial or at this time, and is arguing the weight of
evidence before this Court.
3. The evidence introduced by respondent is adequate to sustain an award of
$4,500.00 severance damages to 9 acres of contiguous lands of respondent which have been
reduced in value by reason of the imposition of the aerial easements in this case.

Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
MARLIN K. JENSEN
15 East 4th South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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